In this paper we provide a complete solution to the existence and characterization problem of optimal capital and risk allocations for not necessarily monotone, law-invariant convex risk measures on the model space L p for any p ∈ [1, ∞]. Our main result says that the capital and risk allocation problem always admits a solution via contracts whose payoffs are defined as increasing Lipschitz-continuous functions of the aggregate risk.
research areas for decades. The introduction of coherent and convex risk measures by Artzner et al. [2] , Föllmer and Schied [16] , and Frittelli and Rosazza-Gianin [17] , respectively, has drawn the attention to study this problem using a new kind of approach (see Barrieu and El Karoui [3] , Jouini et al. [19] , Filipović and Kupper [11] , Burgert and Rüschendorf [6] , Acciaio [1] , and Ludkovski and Rüschendorf [21] ). For some overview of the vast related finance literature, we refer to Dana and Scarsini [9] , Burgert and Rüschendorf [6] , and the references therein.
In this paper we provide a complete solution to the existence and characterization problem of optimal capital and risk allocations for not necessarily monotone, lawinvariant convex risk measures on the model space L p for any p ∈ [1, ∞] . That is, we consider n agents, or business units, with initial endowments X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ L p , who assess the riskiness of their positions by means of some not necessarily monotone, law-invariant convex risk measures ρ i on L p . In order to minimize the total and individual risk, the agents redistribute the aggregate endowment X = X 1 + · · · + X n among themselves. An optimal capital and risk allocation Y 1 , . . . , Y n satisfies Y 1 + · · · + Y n = X and
As is often the case in practice, this redistribution procedure may be subject to frictions (e.g., limited fungibility of capital, see [12, 13] ) in the sense that not every allocation of X is admissible. This can be formalized by restricting the risk measures ρ i accordingly, as proposed in [11] ; see also Sect. 7 below. The restricted ρ i are typically not monotone, even though the original ρ i may be so. But this goes well with our framework, since we do not require monotonicity of ρ i right from the start. Examples for ρ i are mean-risk type risk measures, such as mean-variance, which obviously are convex law-and cash-invariant, but not monotone on L p . Our main result says that there always exists a solution to (1.1) in L p of the form Y i = f i (X) with some increasing Lipschitz-continuous functions f i : R → R with n i=1 f i = Id R . In other words, the capital and risk allocation problem (1.1) always admits a solution via contracts whose payoffs are defined as (increasing Lipschitzcontinuous) functions of the aggregate risk X. This extremely useful fact is often assumed in economic contract theory. We now set this prevalent economic assumption on a sound mathematical basis.
As regards the uniqueness of the optimal allocation, one always has the freedom to rebalance the cash (Sect. 3). We show that some kind of strict convexity of ρ 1 is a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the optimal allocation up to rebalancing the cash. However, we also provide an example which illustrates that this condition is not necessary.
The existence proof is constructive. Following along the lines of Landsberger and Meilijson [22] , we approximate the optimal allocation by simple random variables. At each level of approximation, the respective approximate solution is comonotone and optimal with respect to the approximate aggregate endowment. This, in principle, allows one to compute the approximate optimal capital and risk allocation at any given level of accuracy. This is a useful fact that will be explored elsewhere.
The article of Jouini et al. [19] has been most influential for this paper. Indeed, Jouini et al. [19] provide the existence of optimal allocations for monotone lawinvariant convex risk measures ρ i on L ∞ . Our motivation was to understand and extend their results beyond L ∞ , which from an applied perspective is a very limited model space (e.g., L ∞ does not contain normally distributed random variables). Moreover, in view of the predominant use of mean-variance risk preferences in the literature and also the framework in [11] , it was necessary to abandon the monotonicity assumption. Acciaio [1] provides further examples of this kind.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2, we state our main existence result (Theorem 2.5) and illustrate it with various examples. In Sect. 3, we elaborate on the uniqueness of optimal allocations. In Sect. 4, we reduce the n-agent problem on L p to the case n = 2 and p = 1. Section 5 contains the core of the proof of Theorem 2.5. This is a result of Landsberger and Meilijson [22] , which however they only proved for simple random variables. We thus provide a full and comprehensive proof. In Sect. 6, we accomplish the proof of Theorem 2.5. Section 7 discusses the above mentioned optimal allocation problem under constraints. Appendices A and B contain lemmas that are needed for the proof of our main results.
Existence of optimal allocations
Throughout this paper, (Ω, F, P) denotes an atomless probability space such that L 2 (Ω, F, P) is separable. All equalities and inequalities between random variables are understood in the P-almost sure (a.s.) sense. If not specified otherwise, in the sequel, we let p
can be identified with ba, the space of all bounded finitely-additive signed measures on (Ω, F) which vanish on P-null sets. With some facilitating abuse of notation, we shall write
We suppose that the reader is familiar with standard terminology and basic duality theory for convex functions as outlined in [23] or [10] . We call a function
The conjugate function The indicator function of a set C is defined as 
where q X denotes the left-continuous quantile function of X; in particular,
(ii) the entropic risk measure with parameter β > 0 defined as
It is well known and can be found in, e.g., [15] that AVaR α is continuous on L p for α > 0, and −essinf and Entr β are l.s.c. on L p and continuous on L ∞ . We now formalize the above capital and risk allocation problem. Let n ≥ 2 and
The following properties are well known (see, e.g., [23] , Theorems 5.4 and 16.4).
Lemma 2.2
. Such a minimizing allocation is called an optimal allocation of X. The convolution is said to be exact if it is exact at every point X ∈ L p . Hence, the capital and risk allocation problem outlined in Sect. 1 is equivalent to finding an optimal allocation for the convolution n i=1 ρ i of n convex cash-invariant functions ρ i .
Definition 2.4 An allocation
The following existence theorem is the main result of this paper. The proof is given in Sect. 6.
In other words, n i=1 ρ i is exact, and amongst the optimal allocations of any X ∈ L p , there always is a comonotone one.
Remark 2.6
The economic message of Theorem 2.5 is that the capital and risk allocation problem (1.1) always admits a solution via contracts whose payoffs are defined as (increasing Lipschitz-continuous) functions f i (X) of the aggregate risk X. We note that this extremely useful fact is often assumed in economic contract theory. Theorem 2.5 now sets this prevalent economic assumption on a sound mathematical basis.
We note that the functions ρ i in Theorem 2.5 do not have to be monotone. In case at least one of them is monotone (i.e., a convex risk measure), we may draw the following stronger conclusion: Next we apply Theorem 2.5 to calculate optimal allocations for Average Value at Risks and entropic risk measures, respectively. These convolutions are discussed thoroughly in, e.g., [4] or [18] for L ∞ . In contrast, we provide our results on L 1 .
Example 2.8
The Average Value at Risk (2.1) can be represented as
This representation is well known for X ∈ L ∞ (see, e.g., [16] , Theorem 4.47) and is extended to L 1 in [15] . Now let 0 ≤ β ≤ γ ≤ 1. Then
This is easily verified employing Theorem 2.5, Lemma 2.2, the Fenchel-Moreau theorem, and the fact that dom AVaR * γ ⊂ dom AVaR * β , implied by (2.4).
Example 2.9
The entropic risk measure (2.2) can be represented as
where
dP ] denotes the relative entropy, and M(P) is the set of all probability measures Q on (Ω, F) such that Q P and dQ/dP is bounded. This representation is well known for X ∈ L ∞ (see, e.g., [16] , Example 4.33) and is extended to L 1 in [15] . Now let 0 < β ≤ γ . Theorem 2.5 and Lemma 2.2 justify the following dual approach for any X ∈ L 1 :
Now, in the search for comonotone optimal allocations, the following ansatz seems natural. We guess that, for any X ∈ L 1 , there must be an (obviously comonotone) optimal allocation amongst the allocations of type (aX, bX) with a ∈ [0, 1] and b := 1 − a. If so, then 
Indeed, on the one hand, we know that ρ
, which implies that ρ 1 ρ 2 ≥ −E. On the other hand,
because AVaR α is continuous and X1 {X≤−K} → 0 in L 1 for K → ∞. This proves (2.6). Now choose any X ∈ L 1 which is unbounded from below. Suppose that there is an optimal allocation (X 1 , X 2 ) of X. Then X 1 must be bounded and X 2 unbounded from below, respectively. In view of Lemma 2.11 below, we thus have AVaR α (X 2 ) > E[−X 2 ], and hence
which contradicts (2.6). Hence, there exists no optimal allocation of X. 
for all X, Y ∈ dom ρ 1 with X − Y / ∈ R. Then any optimal allocation of X ∈ L p with n i=1 ρ i (X) < ∞ is unique up to rebalancing the cash.
Proof Let X ∈ L p with n i=1 ρ i (X) < ∞. We argue by contradiction and suppose that (X 1 , . . . , X n ) and (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) are optimal allocations of X with
But this contradicts the optimality of X i , whence the claim.
For instance, the optimal allocation for the entropic risk measure in Example 2.9 is unique up to rebalancing the cash. More recent examples of strictly convex risk measures can be found in [8] .
Without the strict convexity assumption in Proposition 3.1, the uniqueness does not hold in general. A trivial example is
(−E) (−E) = −E.
In this case, all allocations of any X ∈ L 1 are optimal allocations of X.
Moreover, the following example shows that the uniqueness may even fail in the class of comonotone allocations without the strict convexity assumption in Proposition 3.1. On the other hand, the strict convexity assumption in Proposition 3.1 is not necessary for the uniqueness up to rebalancing the cash. This is shown by the following example.
Example 3.3 Let β ∈ (0, 1). We know that AVaR β −E = −E (see Example 2.8). Suppose that (Y, X − Y ) is an optimal allocation of X. This implies that AVaR β (Y ) + E[−(X − Y )] = E[−X], that is, AVaR β (Y ) = E[−Y ].
In view of Lemma 2.11, we conclude that Y must be constant, i.e., a cash position.
Problem reduction
First note that it is enough to prove Theorem 2.5 for n = 2; the rest follows by induction. Indeed, if ρ 1 · · · ρ n−1 > −∞, then the associativity holds, i.e.,
For the sake of simplicity, we further restrict our studies to the case p = 1. From the nature of the arguments presented in the proof of Theorem 2.5 (Sect. 6) it will become clear that they all literally carry over to L p , simply by replacing L 1 with L p and choosing the appropriate dual. However, in what follows, we give another justification for the restriction to L 1 by proving that the assertions of Theorem 2.5 for the L p -cases can be derived as a corollary from knowing it for the case of L 1 . The main ingredient for this is the following result:
s.c. law-invariant convex cash-invariant function. Then there is a unique l.s.c. law-invariant convex cash-invariant function
Proof See [15] .
Clearly, if (f, g) ∈ A, then both f and g are 1-Lipschitz-continuous. Hence we have 
). Clearly, we have
, we deduce that
Hence, firstly, ρ 1 ρ 2 is simply the restriction of ρ 1 ρ 2 to L p and thus a l.s.c. (with respect to · p ) law-invariant convex cash-invariant function. (The l.s.c. stems from the fact that the · p -convergence implies the · 1 -convergence.) Secondly, ρ 1 ρ 2 is exact, and there is always a comonotone optimal allocation.
Comonotone concave order improvement
We denote by c the concave order on L 1 
, that is, X c Y if and only if E[u(X)] ≥ E[u(Y )]
for all concave functions u : R → R. Clearly, since Id R and − Id R are concave functions,
(5.1) For a proof of (5.1), we refer to Corollary 2.62 in [16] .
Proposition 5.1 below will turn out to be the basis of the proof of Theorem 2.5. It is based upon the results of Landsberger and Meilijson [22] and states that every allocation is dominated in concave order by a comonotone allocation. The importance of this result becomes clear by (A.2), where we establish that any l.s.c. law-invariant convex function is monotone with respect to the c -order.
Proposition 5.1 (See Proposition 1 in [22]) For any allocation
Unfortunately, Landsberger and Meilijson [22] only proved this result for random variables X supported by a finite set. For the sake of completeness, we thus give a full proof here.
Proof We divide the proof into three steps.
Step 1: We start out as in [22] 
by noticing that Jensen's inequality implies that (E[Y |X], E[Z|X]) is an allocation of X which is at least as good as (Y, Z), meaning that E[Y |X] c Y and E[Z|X] c Z. Let h
. Clearly, we may assume that h 1 + h 2 = Id R . If h 1 and h 2 are increasing, we are done; if not, we go on improving this allocation. However, we have now established that during the remainder of this proof we may restrict ourselves to improve allocations (Y, Z) of type Y = h 1 (X) and Z = h 2 (X) for some measurable functions h 1 , h 2 : R → R such that h 1 + h 2 = Id R .
Step 2: Suppose that X is a simple random variable, i.e., X = n i=1 x i 1 A i for a partition A 1 , . . . , A n of Ω and real numbers x i such that x i = x j for i = j . Let
We set x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ), y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ), z := (z 1 , . . . , z n ) , and p k := P(A k ), k = 1, . . . , n. Let π be a permutation of {1, . . . , n} such that
Observe that (h 1 (X), h 2 (X)) is comonotone if and only if y π , z π ∈ D. For the sake of brevity, we may and do assume w.l.o.g. that x ∈ D already. Supposing that (y, z) is not comonotone, i.e., y ∈ D or z ∈ D or both, the following algorithm by M. Landsberger and I. Meilijson transfers (y, z) into a comonotone allocation: Since (y, z) is not comonotone, there must exist an i such that
Then there is a smallest j such that z i+1 < z j . For k = j, . . . , i, we set
The other coordinates of y and z are left unchanged. Finally, set y := y new and z := z new and repeat the procedure in case the output is not comonotone. 
and recalling that concavity is equivalent to
we compute
Step 3: Let X be any integrable random variable. Recalling the usual monotone approximation from Lebesgue integration theory, let (Y n ) n∈N and (Z n ) n∈N be sequences of simple random variables converging P-a.s. and in L 1 to Y and Z, respectively, such that |Y n | ≤ |Y | and |Z n | ≤ |Z| for all n ∈ N. Then X n := Y n + Z n converges to X P-a.s. and in L 1 . By step 2, for each n ∈ N, there exists a comonotone improvement (f n (X n ), g n (X n )) of (Y n , Z n ). Choose N ∈ N such that Y n 1 ≤ Y 1 + 1, Z n 1 ≤ Z 1 + 1, and X n 1 ≤ X 1 + 1 for all n ≥ N . Since all f n (and g n ) are 1-Lipschitz-continuous, we have that |f n (0)| ≤ |X n | + |f n (X n )|. Taking the expectations on both sides yields
and thus f n (0), g n (0) ∈ [−K, K] for K := max{K 1 , K 2 }. Therefore, by Lemma B.1, there is a subsequence (f n k ) k∈N of (f n ) n∈N and a 1-Lipschitz-continuous increasing function f : R → R such that f (a) = lim k→∞ f n k (a), a ∈ R. Now it is easily verified that (g n k ) k∈N converges pointwise to the 1-Lipschitz-continuous increasing function g := Id R −f . Hence, the sequence f n k (X n k ) converges Pa.s. to f (X), and g n k (X n k ) = X n k − f n k (X n k ) converges P-a.s. to g(X). Since |f n k (X n k )| ≤ |X n k | + K ≤ |Y | + |Z| + K and |g n k (X n k )| ≤ |Y | + |Z| + K for large enough k ∈ N, we can apply the dominated convergence theorem, which yields
Moreover, in view of (5.1), we have that
and, for all c ∈ R,
and similarly for g. Hence, (f (X), g(X)) is a comonotone allocation of X satisfying f (X) c Y and g(X) c Z according to (5.1).
Proof of Theorem 2.5
In view of Sect. 4, we only have to prove Theorem 2.5 for n = 2 and p = 1. To this end, let
We divide the proof into four steps.
Step 1: ρ 1 ρ 2 is proper, convex, and cash-invariant.
Proof It is easily verified that the convolution preserves the convexity of ρ 1 and ρ 2 . By (A.4) we have that
Furthermore, for all r ∈ R, we get
due to the cash-invariance of ρ 1 .
Step 2:
Proof This is an immediate consequence of Proposition 5.1 and (A.2).
Step 3: ρ 1 ρ 2 is exact, and, for each X ∈ L 1 , there exists a comonotone optimal allocation.
Proof Suppose that X ∈ L 1 is such that ρ 1 ρ 2 (X) = ∞. Then every allocation (f (X), g(X)), (f, g) ∈ A, is optimal. Now let X ∈ dom ρ 1 ρ 2 and choose a sequence (f n , g n ) ∈ A, n ∈ N, such that ρ 1 ρ 2 (X) = lim n→∞ ρ 1 (f n (X)) + ρ 2 (g n (X)). By the cash-invariance we may assume that f n (0) = g n (0) = 0 for all n ∈ N. Hence, by Lemma B.1, there is a subsequence (f n k ) k∈N of (f n ) n∈N and a 1-Lipschitz-continuous and increasing function f : R → R such that f (a) = lim k→∞ f n k (a) for all a ∈ R. Clearly, the sequence f n k (X) converges P-a.s. to f (X) and g n k (X) = X − f n k (X) converges Pa.s. to g(X), where g := Id R −f is a 1-Lipschitz-continuous increasing function. Since |f n k (X)| ≤ |X| and |g n k (X)| ≤ |X| for all k ∈ N, we may apply the dominated convergence theorem, which yields f (X), g(X) ∈ L 1 and f (X) − f n k (X) 1 → 0, g(X) − g n k (X) 1 → 0 for k → ∞. On the one hand, by l.s.c., we have 
≥ ρ 1 f (X) + ρ 2 g(X) .
On the other hand, by the very definition of the convolution, we also have ρ 1 ρ 2 (X) ≤ ρ 1 (f (X)) + ρ 2 (g(X)). Consequently, the comonotone allocation (f (X), g(X)) of X is optimal.
Step 4: ρ 1 ρ 2 is l.s.c. and law-invariant.
Proof We claim that A ρ 1 ρ 2 is closed. To this end, let (X n ) n∈N ⊂ A ρ 1 ρ 2 be a sequence converging to some X in L 1 . According to Step 3, there are (f n , g n ) ∈ A, n ∈ N, such that 0 ≥ ρ 1 ρ 2 (X n ) = ρ 1 (f n (X n )) + ρ 2 (g n (X n )). By the cashinvariance we may assume that f n (0) = g n (0) = 0 for all n ∈ N. Similarly to Step 3, employing Lemma B.1, we find a subsequence (f n k , g n k ) k∈N of (f n , g n ) n∈N and (f, g) ∈ A such that f n k (X n k ) converges to f (X) in L 1 and g n k (X n k ) converges to g(X) in L 1 . By l.s.c. of ρ 1 and ρ 2 we get ≤ lim inf k→∞ ρ 1 f n k (X n k ) + ρ 2 g n k (X n k ) ≤ 0, and thus X ∈ A ρ 1 ρ 2 . Hence, A ρ 1 ρ 2 is closed, i.e., ρ 1 ρ 2 is l.s.c. The lawinvariance of ρ 1 ρ 2 follows from Lemma 2.2 and the fact that a l.s.c. convex function on L 1 is law-invariant if and only if so is its dual (see (A.1)).
Optimal risk sharing under constraints
This application is motivated and explained in [11] . Two agents with initial endowments X 1 and X 2 in L p assess their individual risk by means of l.s.c. law-invariant convex risk measures ρ 1 and ρ 2 on L p , respectively. In order to minimize total and individual risk, they redistribute the aggregate endowment X = X 1 + X 2 amongst themselves. As is often the case in practice, this redistribution procedure might be subject to some restrictions in the sense that not every risk sharing of X is admissible. We formalize this by defining the set of admissible risk shearing of X as 
